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INTRODUCTION
Privacy rights have been a hotly debated issue for the past few
decades, increasingly so with the ever-growing presence of the
Internet in the daily lives of Americans. The reach of the Internet
has expanded so significantly that according to a recent poll
conducted by BBC World Service, nearly four out of five people
across the world believe that access to the Internet is a fundamental
right.1 This survey of more than 27,000 adults across twenty-six
countries suggests that the Internet should be regarded as basic
infrastructure and that this right to communicate should not be
ignored.2 While some countries, including Finland and Estonia,
have ruled that Internet access is a human right for their citizens,
questions remain about the appropriate level of government
oversight of certain aspects of the Internet.3 Though nearly
seventy-nine percent of the survey respondents either strongly
agreed or somewhat agreed with the characterization of access to
1

Internet Access Is ‘A Fundamental Right,’ BBC NEWS, Mar. 8, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8548190.stm.
2
Id.
3
Id.
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the Internet as a fundamental right and believed in its positive
impact in bringing them greater freedom, many also expressed
concerns: in rank order, these included fear of fraud, easy access to
explicit and violent content, and privacy worries.4
The fact that privacy appears third on this list of concerns is
itself disturbing. Think about how much time you, the reader,
spend on the Internet each day. You can read your e-mail
messages, make a purchase online, read a blog,5 or conduct
searches using Google,6 Bing,7 Yahoo!,8 or another of the myriad
of Internet search engines available. Both the sheer number of
users, each conducting individual activities on the Internet, and the
amount of personal information shared in each of those activities
(e.g., typing in an e-mail password, or entering a credit card
number when making an online purchase) is staggering. If this
highly sensitive information, or even something more innocuous
such as a user’s search terms,9 were to enter the wrong hands, the
consequences could be dire.
In response, the United States government, beginning in 1998,
created initiatives aimed at the protection of cyber systems. These
initiatives designated cyber systems as a part of the nation’s critical
infrastructure.10 Subsequent government initiatives were designed
to reinforce the important role of cyberspace in America, while
striving to maintain a balance between government oversight and

4

Id.
See Michael Conniff, Just What Is a Blog, Anyway?, ONLINE JOURNALISM REV.
(Sept. 29, 2005), http://www.ojr.org/ojr/stories/050929.
6
Google Corporate Information, Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.
com/corporate (last visited May 2, 2010).
7
Discover Bing, BING, http://www.discoverbing.com/behindbing/about.aspx (last
visited May 2, 2010).
8
Corporate Information, YAHOO!, http://info.yahoo.com/center/us/yahoo/ (last visited
Aug. 10, 2010).
9
See, e.g., About Google Trends, GOOGLE TRENDS, http://www.google.com/intl/en/
trends/about.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2010). Google Trends allows a user to see data
about how often a given topic has been entered into the Google search engine over time,
on a particular day, or in a specific geographic region. Id.
10
WHITE HOUSE, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PDD-63 1–2 (May 22, 1998)
[hereinafter PDD-63], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.pdf; see
also infra Part I.A.
5
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individual privacy rights.11 Several prominent privacy rights
organizations have heavily criticized the government’s
involvement in Internet regulation and security.12
The efforts of private corporations to protect personal data
online have also been subjected to criticism. For example, the
satirical newspaper The Onion recently published an article in
response to some of the privacy concerns associated with the
Internet giant, Google.13 While the article specifically attacked a
new Google service that had recently launched,14 it also generally
described a worst-case scenario involving the private data of
Google users. It reported a fictitious apology issued by Google
CEO, Eric Schmidt. In the article, Schmidt apologized to Google
users, “particularly the 1,237,948 who take daily medication to
combat anxiety—for causing unnecessary distress, and . . .
expressed regret—particularly to Patricia Fort, a single mother
taking care of Jordan, Sam, and Rebecca, ages 3, 7, and 9—for not
doing more to ensure that private information remains private.”15
11

See, e.g., PDD-63, supra note 10.
See, e.g., CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., http://www.cdt.org/issue/cybersecurity
(last visited Sept. 13, 2010); Cybersecurity Privacy Practical Implications, ELEC.
PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy /cybersecurity/default.html (last visited Sept.
13, 2010); Online Privacy & Technology, PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE,
http://www.privacyrights.org/Online-Privacy-and-Technology (last visited Sept. 13
2010); Technology and Liberty, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.
aclu.org/technology-and-liberty (last visited Sept. 13 2010); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., DHS PRIVACY OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 44–45 (Sept. 2009), available
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_rpt_annual_ 2009.pdf. Despite the
vocal criticisms of government regulation of the Internet, only two pages of the most
recent DHS privacy report to Congress are dedicated to cybersecurity. See id.
13
See Google Responds to Privacy Concerns with Unsettlingly Specific Apology, THE
ONION (Mar. 2, 2010), http://www.theonion.com/content/news/google_responds_to_
privacy [hereinafter Google Responds to Privacy Concerns].
14
Id. On February 9, 2010, Google launched a product called Buzz, which created a
social networking platform within Gmail, Google’s webmail service, through which users
were set up to automatically “share” interesting items (photos, videos, links to Web sites,
etc.) with the user’s most frequent Gmail contacts. Several days later, Google made a
number of improvements in response to a flurry of user criticisms concerning the privacy
of their individual data as visible through Buzz. See Todd Jackson, A New Buzz Start-Up
Experience Based on Your Feedback, OFFICIAL GMAIL BLOG (Feb. 13, 2010, 3:53 PM),
http://gmailblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-buzz-start-up-experience-based-on.html;
Todd Jackson, Introducing Google Buzz, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Feb. 9, 2010, 11:06
AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/02/introducing-google-buzz.html.
15
Google Responds to Privacy Concerns, supra note 13.
12
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The point of the article was to illustrate exactly how much personal
information is available over the Internet, and especially to show
the astounding amount of data shared within Google’s individual
services (e.g., search and e-mail). While the piece is clearly an
exaggeration, it satirizes lingering Internet privacy concerns. Such
concerns represent a significant part of the discussion regarding the
recent alliance formed between Google and the National Security
Agency. This alliance was formed in response to cyberattacks16
which originated in China and targeted Google’s corporate
infrastructure.17 As a consequence of these cyberattacks, some of
Google’s intellectual property was stolen, prompting it to enlist the
assistance of the National Security Agency to improve the security
of its digital infrastructure.18
This Note seeks to explore the alliance between Google and the
National Security Agency and how it fits within the framework
established by the government to protect the critical technology
and cybersecurity infrastructure of the United States. It will
address whether the alliance is consistent with or represents a
departure from existing government policies, in terms of its
effectiveness and the consequences for privacy protection. This
Note argues that the alliance, while retaining certain elements of
current government cybersecurity initiatives, points to clear
deficiencies in these policies and answers several recent calls for
change in cybersecurity programs. This Note concludes that while
the Google-NSA alliance is a significant step toward improved
cybersecurity, more work needs to be done in order to adequately
protect cyberspace.
Part I will investigate the history of the United States
cyberspace policy from the Clinton administration to the present
administration. It will also explore both Google and the NSA as
individual entities and outline the available details about the
alliance. Part II will examine both sides of the debate regarding
16
See What Is a Cyberattack?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-acyberattack.htm (last visited May 2, 2010) (“A cyberattack is an attempt to undermine or
compromise the function of a computer-based system, or attempt to track the online
movements of individuals without their permission.”).
17
See infra Part I.B.1.
18
See id.
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whether the Google-NSA alliance is a product of existing
cybsercurity policy or whether it highlights deficiencies in the
existing regime. Finally, Part III of this Note will argue that the
Google-NSA alliance retains the fundamental principles of present
cyber policy initiatives, but the alliance’s innovations point to
deficiencies in existing U.S. cybersecurity policy which indicate
that the current framework needs improvement. This Part will also
discuss the cybersecurity deficiencies that exist within critical
infrastructures of the defense sector, and conclude that problems
across two critical infrastructure sectors suggest that government
cybersecurity policies to date have been largely deficient and thus
require improvement.
I. BACKGROUND: CYBERSECURITY POLICY, GOOGLE, AND THE
NSA
President Barack Obama has identified cybersecurity as one of
the most significant national security challenges faced by the
United States today, and recently stated that the nation is not
sufficiently prepared to respond to cyber threats.19 Nevertheless,
there are initiatives currently in place for reviewing and improving
our nation’s cybersecurity,20 all of which address the goal of
protecting and securing the United States in cyberspace.21 In order
to comprehend some of the current strategies to achieve this
19

NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE 1 (Mar.
2, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity. pdf.
20
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION
PLAN (2006) [hereinafter 2006 NIPP], available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
dhs/nipp.pdf; WHITE HOUSE, CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW (2009) [hereinafter
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/
documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf; WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL
STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE (2003) [hereinafter NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE
CYBERSPACE], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/National_Cyberspace_
Strategy.pdf; Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, 39 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1816 (Dec.
17, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-7], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_
1214597989952.shtm#1; Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on
Securing Our Nation’s Cyber Infrastructure (May 29, 2010) [hereinafter Remarks by the
President], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-presidentsecuring-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure.
21
THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE, supra note 19.
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objective, one must have a broad understanding of past and present
cyberspace policy, as well as background knowledge of the two
organizations comprising the Google-NSA alliance.
A. History of United States Cybersecurity Policy
Citing the nation’s increasing reliance on cyber-based
information systems, the United States government began focusing
on the cyber aspects of critical infrastructure in 1998.22 Since then,
the nation’s reliance on the Internet has increased exponentially
and cybersecurity initiatives have reflected this augmented usage,
focusing on several particular areas: partnerships between the
public sector and private industry, information sharing in
cyberspace, and concern for the privacy rights and civil liberties of
the individual.
1. 1998–2002
On May 22, 1998, President Clinton issued Presidential
Decision Directive/PDD-63 (“PDD-63”), which took a broad view
of critical infrastructure protection.23 The directive defined critical
infrastructures as “those physical and cyber-based systems
essential to the minimum operations of the economy and the
government.”24 This definition encompassed a variety of sectors,
including, but not limited to, “telecommunications, energy,
banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency
services, both governmental and private.”25 Historically, many of
these infrastructure systems had been separate and independent
from each other, both physically and logically;26 however,
government documents often refer to critical infrastructure
collectively as Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
(“CIKR”).27

22

PDD-63, supra note 10, at 1.
See generally id.
24
Id. at 1.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
See, e.g., 2006 NIPP, supra note 20; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE
INDUSTRIAL BASE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND KEY RESOURCES SECTOR-SPECIFIC
PLAN AS INPUT TO THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (2007) [hereinafter
23
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Technological advances and increased efficiencies have created
a level of interdependence and connectivity between the nation’s
various critical infrastructures. However, they have created new
vulnerabilities as well. PDD-63 expressed President Clinton’s
intent to eliminate significant weaknesses to both physical and
electronic attacks on critical infrastructures, “including especially
our cyber systems.”28 The directive called for a “closely
coordinated effort of both the government and the private sector . .
. [that] must be genuine, mutual and cooperative”29 in order to be
successful. This initiative marked the advent of public-private
partnerships to secure individual sectors of the nation’s critical
infrastructure by appointing senior officials from designated “Lead
Agencies” to work with the private industry in each sector.30
PDD-63 designated the Department of Defense (“DoD”) as the
Lead Agency for national defense.31 Later, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 established the Department of Homeland Security
(“DHS”) as an executive department of the United States.32
Within DHS, a Directorate for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection was created33 to receive, access, and
analyze information received from government agencies as well as
the private sector at the national, local, and state levels. The
Directorate was to “(A) identify and assess the nature and scope of
terrorist threats to the homeland; (B) detect and identify threats of
terrorism against the United States; and (C) understand such
threats in light of actual and potential vulnerabilities of the
homeland.”34 The Under Secretary for Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection, leading the Directorate, was also tasked

DIB SSP], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-defense-industrialbase.pdf.
28
PDD-63, supra note 10.
29
Id.
30
Id. (“For each infrastructure sector that could be a target for significant cyber or
physical attack, there will be a single U.S. Government department which will serve as
the lead agency for liaison.”).
31
See id.
32
6 U.S.C. § 111(a) (2006).
33
Id. § 121(a).
34
Id. § 121(d)(1).
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with several functions involving the synthesis and protection of the
information received, including:


To carry out comprehensive assessments of
the vulnerabilities of the key resources and
critical infrastructure of the United States . .
..
 To develop a comprehensive national plan
for securing the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States . . . .
 To recommend measures necessary to
protect the key resources and critical
infrastructure of the United States . . . .
 To consult with State and local governments
and private sector entities to ensure
appropriate exchanges of information,
including
law
enforcement-related
information, relating to threats of terrorism
against the United States . . . .
 To ensure that . . . any material received
pursuant to this Act is protected from
unauthorized disclosure and handled and
used only for the performance of official
duties . . . .35
Thus, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 emphasized the
protection of the information collected pursuant to DHS’s
information analysis and infrastructure protection efforts. In
addition, the creation of DHS as an executive department resulted
in significant implications for cybersecurity, discussed below.
Collaboration between the public and private sectors was again
highlighted with the creation of the Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information Program (“PCII”).36 This informationprotection program was established to enhance information sharing
between the government and the private sector. Today it is still
used to “[a]nalyze and secure critical infrastructure and protected
35

Id. § 121(d).
See Protected Critical Infrastructure (PCII) Program, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND
SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/editorial_0404.shtm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
36
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systems, [i]dentify vulnerabilities and develop risk assessments,
and [e]nhance recovery preparedness measures.”37
When information is submitted, from the private sector to the
government sector under PCII, it is subjected to the requirements
of the Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 (“CII”).38
The specific protections of voluntarily shared critical infrastructure
information under the CII are delineated in 6 U.S.C. § 133.39
Under PCII, if the requirements of the Act are met, the information
submitted to the government is protected from the Freedom of
Information Act,40 state and local disclosure laws, and use in civil
litigation. The information is also destroyed or returned to the
submitter if the enumerated conditions are not met.41 Thus, even
the earliest government cybersecurity initiatives included
significant measures to protect information privacy.
2. 2003–2008
In February 2003, the Bush White House issued the National
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, which identified cyberspace as the
“nervous system” of the country42 and highlighted the role of
public-private engagement in securing it.43 The Strategy identifies
five national priorities with regard to security in cyberspace: “(1) a
national cyberspace security response system; (2) a national
cyberspace security threat and vulnerability reduction program; (3)
a national cyberspace security awareness and training program; (4)
securing governments’ cyberspace; and (5) and national security
and international cyberspace security cooperation.”44 The second,
third, and fourth priorities are targeted toward reducing threats
from, and vulnerabilities to cyber attacks.45 Under the umbrella of
the first listed priority, a national cyberspace security response
system, the collaboration between public and private entities is
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id.
Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 131–34.
Id. § 133.
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552.
See Protected Critical Infrastructure (PCII) Program, supra note 36.
See NATIONAL STRATEGY TO SECURE CYBERSPACE, supra note 20, at iv, 1.
Id. at 2.
See id. at 3–4.
Id.
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again paramount. Among the eight major initiatives in this listed
priority, four specifically reference the public-private partnership.46
On December 17, 2003, President Bush issued Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 7: Critical Infrastructure
Identification, Prioritization, and Protection (“HSPD-7”).47 The
purpose of HSPD-7 was to establish “a national policy for Federal
departments and agencies to identify and prioritize United States
critical infrastructure and key resources and to protect them from
terrorist attacks.”48 This directive superseded President Clinton’s
Presidential Directive, PDD-63.49 HSPD-7 encompassed many
initiatives from prior policies, including adequate protection of
“voluntarily provided information, . . . that would facilitate
terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure and key resources
consistent with the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and other
applicable legal authorities.”50 In addition, DHS and the SectorSpecific Agencies51 were directed to collaborate with appropriate
private sector entities and to encourage information sharing, as
well as to “support sector-coordinating mechanisms: (1) to
identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure and key resources; and (2) to facilitate sharing of
information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities,
incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.”52
This directive again attempted to strike a balance between the need
for security in cyberspace and the privacy interests of the
individual.

46

See id. The four initiatives are as follows: establishing a public-private architecture
for responding to national-level cyber incidents, developing a private sector capability to
share a comprehensive view of the potency of cyberspace, coordinating processes for
voluntary participation in the development of national continuity and contingency plans,
and improving and enhancing public-private information sharing involving cyber threats,
vulnerabilities, and attacks. See id.
47
HSPD-7, supra note 20.
48
Id. ¶ 1.
49
Id. ¶ 37; see also infra Part I.A.1.
50
Id. ¶ 10.
51
Id. ¶ 6(g) (“The term Sector-Specific Agency means a Federal department or agency
responsible for infrastructure protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure
sector or key resources category.”).
52
Id. ¶ 25.
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Most significantly, HSPD-7 directed the DHS Secretary to
“produce a comprehensive, integrated National Plan for Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection to outline national
goals, objectives, milestones, and key initiatives.”53 Four specific
elements were designated for inclusion in the Plan:
a. a strategy to identify, prioritize, and coordinate
the protection of critical infrastructure and key
resources, including how the Department intends
to work with Federal departments and agencies,
State and local governments, the private sector,
and foreign countries and international
organizations;
b. a summary of activities to be undertaken in order
to: define and prioritize, reduce the vulnerability
of, and coordinate the protection of critical
infrastructure and key resources;
c. a summary of initiatives for sharing critical
infrastructure and key resources information and
for providing critical infrastructure and key
resources threat warning data to State and local
governments and the private sectors; and
d. coordination and integration, as appropriate, with
other Federal emergency management and
preparedness activities including the National
Response Plan and applicable national
preparedness goals.54
These component parts, as well as “other Homeland Securityrelated elements as the Secretary deems appropriate,”55 underlie
the formulation of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(“NIPP”),56 released in 2006 and last updated in 2009.57
53

Id. ¶ 27.
Id.
55
Id.
56
See 2006 NIPP, supra note 20.
57
Prior to the release of the completed NIPP in June 2006, many of the initiatives
described in the Plan were delineated in additional government documents. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES AND KEY ASSETS (2003), available at http://www.
dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/Physical_Strategy.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
54
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The overarching goal of the NIPP as written in 2006 is, simply
stated, to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure.58 It “provides
the unifying structure for the integration of existing and future
CIKR protection efforts . . . across sectors” to achieve these
security goals on a national level.59 Specifically, the NIPP has the
objective of “deter[ring] the threat or minimiz[ing] consequences”
associated with attacks on the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and
Key Resources.60 It also outlines the roles for security partners in
the private and public sectors, including regional partners, the
academic community, and government at the state and local
level.61 In accordance with HSPD-7, the NIPP delineates “SectorSpecific Agencies” (replacing the term “Lead Agencies” from
prior policy initiatives, but with substantially the same function) to
lead efforts in each CIKR sector. DHS, specifically the Office of
Cyber Security and Telecommunications, was designated as the
Lead Agency for the Information Technology and
Telecommunications (now known as the Communications) CIKR
sector.62
A risk management framework is the cornerstone of the NIPP
approach to CIKR protection, and the plan also recommends
implementation using “organizational structures and partnerships
committed to sharing and protecting the information needed to
achieve the NIPP’s goal.”63 The “balance between an appropriate
level of security and protection of civil rights and liberties” is
again highlighted as a goal.64 Finally, three larger-scale elements
are discussed in the NIPP: the role of CIKR protection in the
overall homeland security mission, strategies for ensuring the
INTERIM NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (2005), available at
http://cip.gmu.edu/archive/Interim_NIPP_Feb_05.pdf.
58
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 1.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
See id. at 2.
62
See id. at 2–3 (Sector-Specific Agencies “implement the NIPP framework and
guidance as tailored to the specific characteristics and risk landscapes of each of the
CI[]KR sectors designated in HSPD-7.”); see also Office of Cybersecurity and
Communications, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/
gc_1185202475883.shtm (last visited May 2, 2010).
63
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 4.
64
Id. at 5.
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program’s effectiveness and efficiency in the long term, and the
provision of resources for the CIKR protection program.65
In addition, organizations outside of the government sphere
aimed to protect cybersecurity. In December 2008, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (“CSIS”) released a report
entitled “Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency.” CSIS is a
bipartisan nonprofit organization that conducts research and
analysis, develops policy initiatives, and provides “strategic
insights and policy solutions to decision makers.”66 The report
outlined three major findings: cybersecurity is a serious national
security problem for the United States; decisions and actions taken
with regard to cybersecurity must respect both civil liberties and
privacy; and the country will be more secure with a comprehensive
national security strategy in place that encompasses both the
national and international facets of cybersecurity.67
Among the recommendations discussed in the report are
several that fall directly in line with the previous directives and
policy proposals. First, the CSIS recommended the creation of a
national security strategy for cyberspace. It used the acronym
DIME—Diplomatic, Intelligence, Military, and Economic—to
represent the elements needed for a comprehensive solution.68
CSIS also proposed that the White House be placed at the forefront
of cybersecurity leadership and create “a new office for cyberspace
in the Executive Office of the President.”69 The role of publicprivate partnerships was also highlighted; specifically, CSIS
suggested that the government “recast” its relationship with the
private sector and “redesign” the public-private partnership to
include “more clearly defined responsibilities, an emphasis on
building trust among the partners, and a focus on operational
activities” to increase progress.70 CSIS illustrates that non65

See id. at 5–6.
About Us, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, http://csis.org/about-us (last visited
Apr. 10, 2010).
67
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH
PRESIDENCY 1 (Dec. 2008), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securing
cyberspace_44.pdf.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 2.
70
Id.
66
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governmental organizations have come to some of the same
conclusions reached by the government regarding cyberspace
security strategy, and it shares the viewpoint that “greater security
must reinforce citizens’ rights, not come at their expense.”71
3. 2009–present
In late 2008, DHS published a notice in the Federal Register
describing proposed updates to the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan and soliciting public comment “on issues or
language in this draft document.”72 While the basic framework of
the document remained intact, several important changes were
introduced, including publication of the sector-specific plans
(“SSPs”), updates in information sharing mechanisms, and
improvements in other programs led by DHS.73 Somewhat
surprisingly, the 2009 NIPP did not contain an abundance of
additional information or make significant changes regarding the
protection of cyberspace.74
On April 17, 2009, the White House Office of the Press
Secretary released a statement announcing the conclusion of the
sixty-day Cyberspace Review that began on February 9, 2009.75
The purpose of the review was “to develop a strategic framework
to ensure that our initiatives in [cyberspace] are integrated,
resourced and coordinated appropriately, both within the Executive
Branch and with Congress and the private sector.”76 The
conclusion of the review period provided the President with
71

Id. at 15.
See Review and Revision of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 73 Fed.
Reg. 67,532 (Nov. 14, 2008), available at http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/E827106.htm.
73
Id.
74
Compare 2006 NIPP, supra note 20, with U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION PLAN (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf.
75
Press Release, White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on Conclusion of the
Cyberspace Review (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
the_press_office/Statement-by-the-Press-Secretary-on-Conclusion-of-the-CyberspaceReview. The Cyberspace Review analyzed “the plans, programs, and activities underway
throughout the government that address [the U.S.’s] communication and information
infrastructure (i.e. cyberspace).” Id.
76
Id.
72
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conclusions and recommendations for “an optimal White House
organizational structure to address cyberspace-related issues and . .
. an action plan on identifying and prioritizing further work in this
area.”77
Just over a month later, on May 29, President Obama addressed
the nation on the topic of the security of the United States’ cyber
infrastructure.78 President Obama reiterated that no single agency
has the authority and responsibility to undertake the challenge of
securing the country’s cyber networks, and “[n]o single official
oversees cybersecurity policy across the federal government.”79
The President acknowledged the shortcomings of communication
with the private sector and between federal agencies, and
announced that his administration would consider digital
infrastructure as a “strategic national asset” whose protection is a
national security priority.80
President Obama also announced the creation of a new
Cybersecurity Office within the White House led by the
Cybersecurity Coordinator and tasked with the following
responsibilities: “orchestrating and integrating all cybersecurity
policies for the government; working closely with the Office of
Management and Budget to ensure agency budgets reflect those
priorities; and, in the event of major cyber incident or attack,
coordinating our response.”81 Public-private partnerships were
highlighted once again, as a majority of critical infrastructure is
owned by the private sector.
However, President Obama
emphasized that rather than dictate security standards for private
companies, government and industry should work together to find
secure technology solutions that promote economic prosperity.82
Finally, the President reiterated one of the primary concerns
77

Id.
See Remarks by the President, supra note 20.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.; see also Cybersecurity, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
cybersecurity (last visited Oct. 24, 2010) (“To implement the results of [the Cyberspace
Policy Review], the President has appointed Howard Schmidt to serve at the U.S.
Cybersecurity Coordinator and created the Cybersecurity Office within the National
Security Staff . . . .”).
82
Remarks by the President, supra note 20.
78
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associated with cybersecurity: that civil liberties and privacy
remain paramount, and accordingly, that the national cybersecurity
plan not subject private sector networks to government
monitoring.83
The report following the Cyberspace Policy Review was
released in 2009 as a “clean-slate” review of structures and policies
for cybersecurity.84 It is built upon the same central policy goals
as prior initiatives: balancing security and privacy concerns with
the promotion of innovation and economic prosperity;
strengthening cybersecurity accountability and leadership; and
encouraging collaboration between the public and private sectors
on an international level.85 A significant departure from prior
initiatives, however, is the Review’s recommendation that the
White House take the lead on cybersecurity-related issues, to
demonstrate to the nation and the global community that the
United States’ approach to cyberspace protection is a serious
response to threats.86 This divergence will be analyzed in Part
II.A.3 of this Note.
Congress, too, has begun to recognize the importance of
cybersecurity as a national concern and has taken action on the
legislative side. Senator Jay Rockefeller, for example, proposed
the Cybersecurity Act of 2009,87 which addresses the finding that
the failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent national
security problems currently facing the United States and proposes
a number of improvements to correct this deficiency, again
including public-private collaboration.88 The bill has provoked
controversy since its introduction was publicized, and at the time
of this writing, several other bills have been proposed and are
pending in Congress.89
83

Id.
CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 20, at iii.
85
See id., at iii–v.
86
Id. at v.
87
Cybersecurity Act of 2009, S. 773, 111th Cong. (2009).
88
See id.
89
See Philip Shenon, Can Obama Shut Down the Internet?, THE DAILY BEAST (June
18, 2010), http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-06-18/new-bill-wouldlet-obama-police-internet-for-national-security-reasons; Richard Stiennon, Rockefeller’s
Cybersecurity Act of 2010: A Very Bad Bill, THE FIREWALL BLOG, FORBES (May 4, 2010,
84
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The most significant proposition from this history of the
nation’s cybersecurity policies is that while these initiatives have
certainly evolved from the Clinton administration to the beginning
of the Obama administration, several significant components have
remained constant: the continued emphasis on collaboration
between the public sector and private industry, the importance of
information sharing, and the awareness of the privacy rights and
civil liberties of the individual. Part II of this Note will discuss the
role of these three elements in the context of the Google-NSA
alliance, but in order to better understand this fledgling
partnership, its component parts must be considered individually.
B. The Google-NSA Alliance
1. Background Information: Google and the NSA
a) Google
Google’s name derives from the word “googol,” which is the
mathematical term for a 1 followed by 100 zeros as a reflection of
the sheer volume of information that exists in the world.90 Despite
the wide range of products currently offered under the Google
name,91 Google began as a search engine. Today, search still
receives the greatest amount of engineering time among the
Google products, because Google believes that the search engine
can always be improved.92 This falls squarely in line with
Google’s mission: “to organize the world’s information and make
it universally accessible and useful.”93
i. Google’s Privacy Policies and Data Collection Methods
The expansion of Google’s services has led to increasing
concerns about the privacy of Google’s individual users. Google’s
12:43 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/firewall/2010/05/04/rockefellers-cybersecurity-actof-2010-a-very-bad-bill.
90
Corporate Information, Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
corporate/index.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Company Overview].
91
See More Google Products, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/intl/en/options/ (last
visited Apr. 10, 2010) (listing Gmail, Maps, Docs, Calendar, and Reader, among Google
services).
92
Company Overview, supra note 90.
93
Id.
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privacy policy applies to products, services, and websites offered
by Google, Inc. or its affiliated companies and subsidiaries.94
Collectively, these are known as Google’s “services,” and Google
“post[s] supplementary privacy notices as needed to describe how
specific services process personal information.”95 An individual
user is asked to provide specific personal information to Google,
such as a name, an e-mail address, and an account password for
those services that require registration.96
Google’s servers automatically record “log information,” also
known as “server logs,” when a user accesses Google services.97
This information could include a user’s web request, browser type,
Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, date and time of request, browser
language, and one or more “cookies” that may uniquely identify
that user’s browser.98 The privacy policy also states that Google
may also retain e-mail or other communications sent to the
company in order to process user inquiries, respond to user
requests, and improve its services.99 Google’s privacy policy
applies to personal information provided to affiliated Google
services on other sites. Thus, information provided to affiliated
services is protected under Google’s privacy policy. However, the
policy also cautions that affiliated web sites may have different
privacy practices and encourages users to review those sites’
policies.100

94

Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.google.com/intl/en/privacy_
archive.html [hereinafter Google Privacy Policy] (follow “Version 03/11/2009”).
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. A “cookie” is a small file containing a string of characters that is sent to a
computer or other device uniquely identifying the user’s Internet browser when the user
visits Google. Cookies are used to improve the quality of Google’s service, including
improvements in search results and ad selection, storing user preferences, and tracking
user trends, such as how users search. Cookies are also used in advertising services to
help publishers and advertisers manage ads across the Internet, so when a user visits a
website and views or clicks on an ad supported by Google’s advertising services,
including Google sites using advertising cookies, one or more cookies may be set in that
user’s Internet browser. What are Computer Cookies?, WISEGEEK, http://www.
wisegeek.com/what-are-computer-cookies.htm (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
99
Google Privacy Policy, supra note 94.
100
Id.
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Google also emphasizes that personal information is processed
for the limited purposes described within their privacy policy
“and/or the supplementary privacy notices for specific services,”101
as well as other additional purposes, including: “providing our
services, including the display of customized content and
advertising; auditing, research, and analysis in order to maintain,
protect, and improve our services; ensuring the technical
functioning of our network; protecting the rights or property of
Google or our users and developing new services.”102
The most significant take away from Google’s privacy policy
is that it applies to Google services only. Google does not
“exercise control over the sites displayed in search results, sites
that include Google applications, products or services, or links
from within our various services.”103
ii. Information Sharing, Security, and Data Integrity
Google only shares personal information provided by a user
with other companies or individuals under limited
circumstances.104 First, a user must consent for the sharing of any
sensitive personal information, and Google only provides the
information to Google’s “subsidiaries, affiliated companies, or
other trusted businesses or persons for the purposes of processing
personal information.”105 These parties must agree to process this
information based on Google’s instructions, in compliance with
Google’s privacy policy, and any other appropriate security and
confidentiality measures.106
Google also shares personal
information with outside companies where there is a good faith
belief that:
access, use, preservation, or disclosure of such
information is reasonably necessary to (a) satisfy
any applicable law, regulation, legal process or
enforceable government request, (b) enforce
applicable Terms of Service, including investigation
101
102
103
104
105
106

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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of potential violations thereof, (c) detect, prevent, or
otherwise address fraud, security, or technical
issues, or (d) protect against harm to the rights,
property or safety of Google, its users or the public
as required or permitted by law.107
Should Google be involved in a merger, acquisition, or sale of
all or part of its assets, Google will “provide notice before personal
information is transferred and becomes subject to a different
privacy policy.”108 Google will also make certain that personal
information involved in such transactions remains confidential.109
Certain aggregated, non-personal information (such as the numbers
of users who searched a certain term or clicked on a particular
advertisement) may be shared with third parties without identifying
individual users.110 Google takes “security measures to protect
against unauthorized access to or unauthorized alteration,
disclosure or destruction of data . . . [including] internal reviews of
data collection, storage and processing practices and security
measures, as well as physical security measures to guard against
unauthorized access to systems where [it] store[s] personal
data.”111 Google heavily restricts unauthorized access to personal
information.112
Personal information provided to Google is processed in
accordance with the company’s privacy policies.113 Google only
uses the information for its collected purpose, and Google reviews
its storage, collection, and processing practices regularly to ensure
that only the minimum amount of personal information needed to
provide or improve Google services is collected, stored, and
processed.114 Finally, Google will work with both individual users
107

Id.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
See id. Google employees, agents, and contractors are bound by confidentiality
obligations and subject to discipline for non-compliance, and these individuals require
some access to personal information to develop, improve, and operate Google systems.
Id.
113
See id.
114
Id.
108
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and regulatory authorities, if necessary, to respond to formal
written complaints regarding concerns involving the transfer of
personal data.115
Several changes to Google’s privacy policy were implemented
beginning October 3, 2010, and users were notified of these
changes prior to the application of the new policy.116 While the
majority of the policy remains the same as discussed above,
Google deleted twelve product-specific policies so that more
Google products and services are governed by one privacy policy;
and Google modified the overall policy to reduce redundancies and
simplify the legal language to make it easier to understand.117
Google also created a web page detailing the specific additions and
omissions since the last update of the policy on March 11, 2009.118
Despite its robust privacy protection policy, Google was
recently involved in a serious privacy breach. In May 2010,
Google announced on its official blog and on its European Public
Policy blog that some data collected by Google Street View cars
for use in location-based products, such as Google Maps for
mobile phones, mistakenly included “payload data” (information
sent over a wireless network) from open wireless Internet
networks, meaning those that are not protected by a password.119
Payload data includes bits of personal data sent over these
unencrypted networks.120 The European Public Policy blog post
originally stated that no payload data was collected from such
networks; rather, only publicly broadcast information like the
name of the wireless network and the MAC address, which is the
unique number assigned to a device such as a wireless router, was
115

Id.
Mike Yang, Trimming Our Privacy Policies, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010,
9:00 AM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/09/trimming-our-privacy-policies.html.
117
Id.; see also Privacy Policies Update–FAQ, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
privacy_faq_2010.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
118
Privacy Policy Update, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/privacy_changes_2010.
html (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
119
Alan Eustace, WiFi Data Collection: An Update, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (May 14,
2010,
1:44
PM),
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/05/wifi-data-collectionupdate.html; Peter Fleischer, Data Collected by Google Cars, GOOGLE EUROPEAN PUBLIC
POLICY BLOG (Apr. 27, 2010, 1:01 PM), http://googlepolicyeurope.blogspot.com/
2010/04/data-collected-by-google-cars.html.
120
Eustace, supra note 119.
116
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obtained.121 A flurry of criticism followed both the original
announcement and the update including the admission of this
mistake, and could affect the public’s perception of Google’s
ability to keep personal data secure and private.122 In June 2010, it
was announced that Connecticut Attorney General and Senatorelect123 Richard Blumenthal would be leading a thirty-state
investigation into Google’s Wi-Fi gathering scandal.124 Several
countries other than the United States, including Spain, have begun
their own inquiries.125
Notwithstanding this incident, Google is still ranked the
number one most visited website in the world according to threemonth Internet traffic rankings conducted by Alexa,126 a web
information company that maintains a database of statistics and
other related information about popular Web sites.127
121

Fleischer, supra note 119.
See, e.g., Cecilia Kang, Growing Anger Over Google Street View Privacy Breach,
POST TECH. BLOG, WASHINGTONPOST.COM (May 20, 2010, 8:00 PM), http://voices.
washingtonpost.com/posttech/2010/05/the_anger_is_growing_over.html; Cecilia Kang,
Lawmakers Press FTC on Google Street View Privacy Lapse, POST TECH. BLOG,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (May 19, 2010, 3:19 PM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/
posttech/2010/05/us_lawmakers_ press_ftc_on_inve.html; Xeni Jardin, Google: We
Inadvertently Collected Personal Data Sent over Wifi Networks, BOING BOING (May 16,
2010),
http://www.boingboing.net/2010/05/14/google-yes-we-snoope.html;
Jason
Kincaid, Google Admits to Accidentally Collecting Personal Data With Street View Cars,
TECHCRUNCH (May 14, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/05/14/google-admits-toaccidentally-collecting-personal-data-with-street-view-cars; Ross Miller, Street View
Cars Mistakenly Nabs Personal Data over WiFi Networks, Says Google, ENGADGET
(May 14, 2010, 7:51 PM), http://www.engadget.com/2010/05/14/street-view-carsmistakenly-nabs-personal-data-over-wifi-says-g; Kim Zetter, Google Street View Cams
Collected Private Content from WiFi Networks, THREAT LEVEL BLOG, WIRED (May 15,
2010, 7:15 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/05/google-street-view-cams.
123
David M. Halbfinger, Blumenthal Wins in Connecticut to Take Dodd's Senate Seat,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2010, at P12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/
nyregion/03ctsen.html.
124
See, e.g., Scott Morrison, Connecticut to Lead Multi-State Probe of Google, WALL ST.
J., June 21, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870489520457532080
2269077146.html; Tom Krazit, Connecticut Heads up 30-State Google Wi-Fi Probe,
CNET (June 21, 2010, 11:46 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-30684_3-20008332265.html.
125
E.g., Raphael Minder, Google Sued in Spain over Data Collection, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/18/technology/18google.html.
126
Google.com Site Info, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/siteinfo/google.com (last
visited Nov. 21, 2010).
127
Alexa Internet, Company Overview, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/company (last
visited Nov. 21, 2010).
122
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Nevertheless, the amount of data involved in this Wi-Fi breach is
relatively small compared to the volume of data the company
handles on a routine basis.128 Google has also been subjected to
negative publicity in the past without a significant deterrent effect
on its overall usage.129
b) The National Security Agency
The National Security Agency was established, by order of
President Harry S. Truman on November 4, 1952, in the wake of
government work breaking enemy codes during World War II,
which was a significant contributing factor in winning the war.130
The establishment of the NSA followed several government
studies determining how best to continue codebreaking work after
World War II.131
The Central Security Service (“CSS”),
established by Presidential Directive in 1972, includes the
elements of the armed forces (Navy, Air Force, Army, Coast
Guard, and Marine Corps) that engage in codemaking and
codebreaking work along with the NSA.132 The CSS and the NSA
members work together around the world to support both military
and civilian leaders, as well as the White House, policy and
decision makers, and troops at the front lines.133 The governmentwide responsibilities of the NSA/CSS render it unique among the
defense agencies because it provides products and services to the
Department of Defense, government agencies, industry partners,
the Intelligence Community, and select allies and coalition
partners; it also delivers critical strategic and tactical information
to war planners and fighters.134 Specifically, “NSA/CSS provides
128

See Google Transparency Report: Traffic, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/
transparencyreport/traffic (last visited Nov. 21, 2010). “This tool provides information
about [Internet] traffic to [Google] services around the world. Each graph shows historic
traffic patterns for a given country/region and service.” Id.
129
See, e.g., Google Ranked “Worst” on Privacy, BBC NEWS, June 11, 2007,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6740075.stm.
130
Frequently Asked Questions About NSA, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY § 1 (Jan. 15, 2009),
http://www.nsa.gov/about/faqs/about_nsa.shtml [hereinafter FAQ About NSA] (follow
“How and When Was the National Security Agency Established?”).
131
Id.
132
Id. (follow “What Is the Central Security Service?”).
133
Id.
134
Id.
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intelligence products and services to the White House, executive
agencies (such as CIA and the State Department), the Chairman
and Joint Chiefs of Staffs (JCS), military combatant commanders
and component commands, military departments, multinational
forces, and U.S. allies.”135 In addition, it provides Information
Assurance products and services to government contractors and
users of national security information systems.136
The National Security Agency has two core missions: to
protect the national security systems of the United States and to
produce information about foreign intelligence.137 The NSA/CSS
has two interconnected missions: Information Assurance (“IA”),
through which the national security information systems and
information of the United States are protected from theft or
damage; and Signals Intelligence (“SIGINT”), which “gather[s]
information that America’s adversaries wish to keep secret.”138
SIGINT collects foreign intelligence from various sources,
interprets it (often deciphering foreign languages, dialects, and
security codes), and provides it to customers throughout the United
States government, which uses the information to advance national
objectives, including fighting terrorism and protecting military
troops.139 Information Assurance prevents unauthorized access to
classified or sensitive national security information, both by
keeping information safe from unlawful access and ensuring that
the information needed by our decision makers is available and
reliable.140 These two missions assist the function of enabling a
military operation known as Network Warfare.141 In carrying out
these missions, the NSA/CSS defends vital networks, saves lives,
and advances the alliances and goals of the United States.142
Privacy rights guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the

135

Id. (follow “Who Are the NSA/CSS’ Customers?”).
Id.
137
See id.; see also The NSA/CSS Mission, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, http://www.nsa.gov/
about/mission/index.shtml (last visited May 2, 2010).
138
FAQ About NSA, supra note 130 (follow “What Does the NSA/CSS Do?”).
139
Id. (follow “What is Signals Intelligence?”).
140
Id. (follow “What is Information Assurance?”).
141
See id. (follow “Who Are the NSA/CSS’ Customers?”).
142
Id.
136

C05_DEVOS_010411_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/4/2011 6:12 PM

198

[Vol. 21:173

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

United States remain strictly protected in the execution of these
missions.143
2. Events Prompting the Formation of the Google-NSA
Alliance
On January 12, 2010, Google posted an announcement entitled
A New Approach to China on its official blog.144 The posting
publicized the fact that in mid-December 2009, a “highly
sophisticated and targeted attack on [Google’s] infrastructure
originating from China . . . resulted in the theft of intellectual
property from Google.”145 Google highlighted that the attack did
not specifically target Google; the blog post explicitly stated that
“at least twenty other large companies from a wide range of
businesses—including the Internet, finance, technology, media,
and chemical sectors” were also targeted. Nevertheless, a primary
goal of the Google attack was to gain access to the Gmail146
accounts of Chinese human rights activists.147 Investigations thus
far led Google to believe that this objective was not achieved
because only two accounts appeared to have been accessed, and
the “activity was limited to account information (such as the date
the account was created) and subject line, rather than the content of
emails themselves.”148
Independent of this particular attack, but still relevant to
Google’s investigation, was the discovery that dozens of Gmail
accounts (from users in the United States, Europe, and China)
belonging to advocates for human rights in China appeared to have
been accessed by third parties on a routine basis.149 Google

143

Id.
See David Drummond, A New Approach to China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jan. 12,
2010, 3:00 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
[hereinafter Drummond, A New Approach to China].
145
Id.
146
Gmail is Google’s webmail service. See What Is Gmail?, GMAIL HELP, http://
mail.google.com/support/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6554 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
144
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speculated that the accounts were accessed via “phishing” scams150
or “malware”151 placed on a user’s computer, not through a
security breach at Google.152 The information gained from this
attack prompted Google to improve its systems for enhanced
security on the part of Google and its user.153
Google recommended that users take precautions to protect
themselves in cyberspace (such as deploying anti-virus and antispyware programs154 on their computers, installing patches for
their computer operating systems,155 and updating their Internet
browsers).156 The blog post cautioned against clicking on
hyperlinks that appear in instant messages or e-mails, and sharing
personal information like passwords; it also provided a link to
further information on specific cybersecurity recommendations.157

150
See What Is a Phishing Scam?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-aphishing-scam.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2010) (“A phishing scam is an identity theft
scam that arrives via email. The email appears to originate from a legitimate source such
as a trusted business or financial institution and includes an urgent request for personal
information,” typically invoking a critical need to update an account immediately. When
a user clicks on a link in the email, s/he is directed to an official-looking website, but any
personal information provided to this site is sent directly to the scam artist.).
151
Malware is an abbreviation used to refer to a malicious software program. See What
is Malware?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-malware.htm (last visited
Oct. 14, 2010).
152
Drummond, A New Approach to China, supra note 144.
153
Id.
154
Anti-virus software programs detect and remove computer viruses, and anti-spyware
programs remove spyware software from computers. Spyware covertly gathers
information about a user’s Internet use and transmits that information to a third party
individual or company that uses it for marketing or other purposes. See Antivirus
Software, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/antivirus+software
(last visited May 2, 2010); Spyware, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/
browse/spyware (last visited May 2, 2010); see also Do I Need a Spyware Blocker in
Addition to Antivirus Software?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/do-i-need-aspyware-blocker-in-addition-to-antivirus-software.htm (last visited May 2, 2010).
155
A computer’s operating system (abbreviated as “OS”) is a program “designed to run
other programs on a computer.” What Is an Operating System?, WISEGEEK,
http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-an-operating-system.htm (last visited May 2, 2010).
Software companies often issue “patches” between releases of operating systems, to
temporarily correct a flaw in the software until a new version of the OS is released. See
What Is a Software Patch?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-softwarepatch.htm (last visited May 2, 2010).
156
Drummond, A New Approach to China, supra note 144.
157
See id.
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Additional links were supplied for those interested in learning
more about these kinds of attacks.158
Google explained that it had shared the information about the
attacks with the world due to the security and human rights
implications of the information uncovered, but also because of its
significance with regard to the global debate about freedom of
speech.159 In light of China’s economic development over the past
twenty years, Google.cn was launched in January 2006 with the
belief that any discomfort on Google’s part in agreeing to censor
some search results was substantially outweighed by “the benefits
of increased access to information for people in China and a more
open Internet.”160 The recent attacks and the surveillance they
uncovered, as well as China’s continued attempts to further limit
free speech on the Internet, led Google to review the feasibility of
its business operations in China. Google concluded that it was no
longer willing to continue censoring its results on Google.cn, and
announced that it would be discussing the possibility of operating
an unfiltered search engine on Google.cn with the Chinese
government.161
On February 4, 2010, the Washington Post reported that
Google and the National Security Agency had partnered to analyze
158

These links included a report to Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission (“USCC”), a related analysis prepared for the USCC, a presentation
on the GhostNet spying incident, and a blog written by Nart Villaneuve, a self-described
“Internet Censorship Explorer.” See U.S.-CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, 2009
REPORT TO CONGRESS (November 2009), available at http://www.uscc.gov/
annual_report/2009/annual_report_full_09.pdf; BRIAN KREKEL, NORTHROP GRUMMAN,
U.S.-CHINA ECONOMIC AND SECURITY REVIEW COMMISSION REPORT ON THE CAPABILITY
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA TO CONDUCT CYBER WARFARE AND COMPUTER
NETWORK EXPLOITATION (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.uscc.gov/
researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Rep
ort_16Oct2009.pdf; TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIONAGE
NETWORK, INFORMATION WARFARE MONITOR (Mar. 29, 2009), available at
http://www.scribd.com/doc/13731776/Tracking-GhostNet-Investigating-a-CyberEspionage-Network (describing GhostNet as a suspected cyber espionage network of
over 1,295 infected computers in 103 countries, 30% of which are high-value targets,
including ministries of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news
media, and NGOs); NART VILLANEUVE, http://www.nartv.org (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
159
Drummond, A New Approach to China, supra note 144.
160
Id.
161
Id.
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the cyberattacks, with the objective of better defending Google and
its users from future attack.162 Though neither organization
commented on the partnership, sources told the Washington Post
that the alliance allows for the sharing of critical information
without violating Google’s policies or laws that protect Americans’
privacy of online communications. Under the terms of the
alliance, Google will not be sharing proprietary data and the NSA
will not be viewing users’ searches or e-mail accounts.163 The
article stated that Google approached the NSA shortly after the
attacks, but due to the sensitivity of the alliance, the deal took time
to be formulated.164 Any agreement would be the first instance
where Google had entered a “formal information-sharing
relationship” with the NSA; in 2008 the company stated that it had
not cooperated with the NSA’s Terrorist Surveillance Program.165
Sources also said that the focus of the alliance is to better defend
Google’s networks and prevent future attacks, as it would be
nearly impossible to determine the specific origins of the recent
attack after the fact.166
An NSA spokesperson said that the organization works with
many “commercial partners and research associates to ensure the
availability of secure tailored solutions for Department of Defense
and national security systems customers,” but Google’s broad
reach and global presence make it unique among the NSA’s
clients.167 This alliance allows the NSA to help Google evaluate
vulnerabilities in its hardware and software to assist in its defenses,
determine the level of sophistication of the adversary, utilize the
analysis performed by the NSA in prior attacks to help prevent
future incidents, and learn what methods were used to infiltrate
Google’s system.168 Google, in turn, may share details about the
malicious code used to attack Google’s system, without revealing
162

Ellen Nakashima, Google to Enlist NSA to Ward Off Attacks; Firm Won’t Share
User Data, Sources Say, But Deal Raises Issue of Privacy vs. Security, WASH. POST, Feb.
4, 2010, at A1.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id.
168
Id.
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proprietary data about the intellectual property that was taken, as
this disclosure likely would perturb shareholders and subject the
company to public scrutiny and possibly legal action.169
The New York Times reported a similar story about the GoogleNSA alliance the following day, containing many of the same facts
as the Washington Post article, as well as several significant
additions.170 The New York Times piece reported that Google was
partnering with the NSA rather than DHS because the former has
“no statutory authority to investigate domestic criminal acts,”
while the latter has such authority.171 By partnering with the NSA,
then, Google can prevent the government from regulating its
search engine, e-mail, and other services as part of the nation’s
“critical infrastructure.”172 The New York Times called the alliance
a “cooperative research and development agreement,” which is a
specific category created under the Federal Technology Transfer
Act of 1986173 that describes a written agreement between a
government agency and a private company to collaborate on a
particular project with the goal of accelerating the
commercialization of government-developed technology.174 The
article also revealed that Google was working with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to inquire into the attack, but the bureau
made no public comment about the incident.175 Similarly, the NSA
has never issued a formal comment on the existence of an alliance
with Google or any of the details mentioned in the initial news
releases. By contrast, the agency has issued official comments on
at least one other occasion to correct inaccurate portrayals of its
initiatives in the media.176
169

Id.
See John Markoff, Google Asks Spy Agency for Help with Inquiry Into Cyberattacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2010, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/
science/05google.html.
171
Id.
172
Id.
173
Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (2006).
174
Markoff, supra note 170.
175
Id.; see infra Part II of this Note for a discussion of the commentary and criticisms
that followed Google’s announcement.
176
See Siobhan Gorman, U.S. Plans Cyber Shield for Utilities, Companies, WALL
STREET J., July 8, 2010, http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB100014240
52748704545004575352983850463108.html; see also Tony Bradley, NSA “Perfect
170
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In mid-February, The New York Times reported that the Google
cyber attacks had been “traced to computers at two educational
institutions in China,” one of which has close ties to the Chinese
military.177 The article stated that the attacks may have begun
months earlier than previously believed and that the goals of the
attacks were to steal trade secrets and computer codes, and to
access the e-mail accounts of Chinese human rights activists.178
The two schools involved were Shanghai Jiaotong University,
home of one of China’s top computer science programs, and the
Lanxiang Vocational School, which was established with military
support and is responsible for training some of China’s military
computer scientists.179
Spokespeople from the schools said that they had not heard that
the attacks on Google had been traced to their campuses.
However, computer security analysts theorize that the vocational
schools were used as a cover for government operations, that a
third country may have been involved, and that the hacking was
criminal industrial espionage with the goal of stealing intellectual
property from American technology firms.180 Independent
researchers monitoring Chinese information warfare caution that
China has adopted a “highly distributed approach to online
espionage” which renders proof of the origin of an attack nearly
impossible to discover.181
On March 22, 2010, Google posted an update on its official
blog announcing that it would no longer censor its search services
Citizen” Program Is Only One Piece of Cyber Security Puzzle, PC WORLD (July 9, 2010,
7:55 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/200768/nsa_perfect_citizen_
program_is_only_one_piece_of_cyber_security_puzzle.html (discussing the official
response to the “Perfect Citizen” program as characterized by the Wall Street Journal,
issued by a NSA spokesperson via e-mail).
177
John Markoff & David Barboza, 2 China Schools Said to Be Tied to Online Attacks,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/02/19/technology/19china.html.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Id. The theory suggesting involvement on the part of the Chinese government is
corroborated by the documents made public by WikiLeaks on November 28, 2010. See
Scott Shane & Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html.
181
Id.
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on Google.cn.182 “[T]hese attacks and the surveillance they
uncovered—combined with attempts over the last year to further
limit free speech on the web in China including the persistent
blocking of websites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Google
Docs and Blogger”—led Google to cease censorship of search
results on Google.cn.183 From March 22 onward, visitors to
Google.cn were automatically redirected to Google.com.hk and
received the same uncensored search results (including Google
Search, Google News, and Google Images) as users of the Hong
Kong Google site. The site was presented in simplified Chinese
designed for users in China, but the search results were delivered
via Google servers in Hong Kong.184
Google argued that the switch to Google.com.hk was a legal
and appropriate way to allow further access to Google services in
mainland China.185 However, the Chinese government continued
to insist that Internet censorship was a non-negotiable legal
requirement of operating in their country. Google was thus aware
that the Chinese government could block access to Google’s web
services at any time.186 Accordingly, a new web page was created
to detail which Google services are available in China for any
given date and time.187
Several days later, the large Internet domain registration
company Go Daddy changed its policy and began discontinuing
new “.cn” domain registrations188 in China.189 Though Go Daddy
said that the decision to discontinue selling .cn names had nothing
182

David Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG
(Mar. 22, 2010, 12:03 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-tochina-update.html [hereinafter Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update].
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.; see also Miguel Helft & David Barboza, Google Will Redirect China Users to
Hong Kong Site, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2010/03/23/technology/23google.html.
186
See Helft & Barboza, supra note 185.
187
Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update, supra note 182.
188
See What is Domain Registration?, WISEGEEK, http://www.wisegeek.com/what-isdomain-registration.htm (last visited May 2, 2010).
189
Geoffrey A. Fowler, What Does it Cost Go Daddy To Leave China?, WALL ST. J.
BLOG, DIGITS (Mar. 24, 2010, 11:15 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2010/03/24/whatdoes-it-cost-go-daddy-to-leave-china.
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to do with publicity or with Google’s movement of searches into
Hong Kong,190 movement by these two major companies out of
China clearly demonstrates China’s serious and continual threat to
United States cybersecurity. This is especially evident because in
June 2010, Google’s license to operate in China was at risk of not
being renewed. On June 28, 2010, Google announced on its
official blog that it would no longer automatically direct users to
the uncensored Hong Kong site; rather, in an apparent compromise
to appease the Chinese government, users of the Google.cn site
saw a page that allowed them to proceed to the Hong Kong site if
they wished.191 An additional blog update on July 9, 2010
confirmed that web search and other Google products remain
available to users in China.192
These events following the Google attacks are pertinent to the
U.S. government’s attempts to balance its own security needs with
the privacy rights of the individual Internet user. China represents
one extreme of the spectrum, with a high level of government
involvement in cyberspace security, such that the rights of the
individual have been largely stifled.193 As a result, private
companies like Google and Go Daddy have decided to discontinue
or modify their services there.194 The other extreme would entail
little to no government involvement in the security of cyberspace,
which surely would lead to increased cyberattacks. Part II of this
Note will discuss the effectiveness of the current cybersecurity
strategy articulated by the U.S. government, in the context of

190
Id. Christine Jones, General Counsel of the Go Daddy Group, made these
statements during an interview following her testimony at a hearing before the
Congressional-Executive Commission in Washington, D.C. Id.
191
David Drummond, An Update on China, OFFICIAL GOOGLE BLOG (Jun. 28, 2010,
10:45 PM), http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/update-on-china.html [hereinafter
Drummond, An Update on China]; Keith B. Richburg, Google Compromise Pays Off
with Renewal of License in China, WASH. POST, July 10, 2010, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/09/AR2010070902137.html;
see
also China’s Renewal of Google’s License Offers Hope of Resisting Censorship, WASH.
POST, July 14, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/
2010/07/13/AR2010071305390.html.
192
See Drummond, An Update on China, supra note 191 (last updated July 9, 2010).
193
Drummond, A New Approach to China: An Update, supra note 182.
194
See supra Part I.B.2.
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whether the Google-NSA alliance represents continuity and is
demonstrative of its effectiveness.
II. IF GOOGLE IS APPROACHING THE NSA TO PROTECT ITSELF, ARE
CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES PROVING INEFFECTIVE?
As discussed in Part I.B of this Note, very few details have
been made public about the Google-NSA alliance. This Part will
discuss the commentary and criticisms that have followed the
announcement of the partnership. This Part will also present two
competing arguments: that the formation of the alliance reveals the
ineffectiveness of the government’s cybersecurity regime and
highlights the shortcomings of existing policies; and that the
alliance represents the type of partnership envisioned by current
cybersecurity initiatives and demonstrates the effectiveness of
these policies.
A. The Google-NSA Alliance Is a Marked Departure from Current
Policy and Demonstrative of its Ineffectiveness
Privacy is at the heart of the discussion about the Google-NSA
alliance. Despite the benefits of the alliance discussed in Part II.B,
privacy organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union
(“ACLU”) and the Electronic Privacy Information Center195 have
heavily criticized Internet privacy policies generally, as well as
Google’s policy specifically, for its insufficient protection of users.
These concerns play an important role in view of the Google-NSA
alliance as a significant departure from the government’s stated
cybersecurity policies.
1. The NSA Is the Designated Government Agency
Since 2002, DHS has been at the forefront of national security
matters, and was designated as the Lead Agency for the technology
sector in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.196 By
195

See Technology and Liberty, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, http://www.aclu.org/
technology-and-liberty (last visited Sept. 15, 2010); see also Cybersecurity Privacy
Policy Implications, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR., http://epic.org/privacy/cybersecurity/
default.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
196
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 3.
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contrast, the NSA is not mentioned by name in the NIPP as a
Sector-Specific Agency for any critical infrastructure sector.197 Its
inclusion as the de facto lead government agency in its partnership
with Google is thus a significant departure from stated government
policies regarding CIKR protection. Though DHS was designated
as the Sector-Specific Agency for both the Information
Technology sector and Communications sector, the NIPP indicates
that organizations like the NSA that “have unique responsibilities,
functions, or expertise in a particular CI[]KR sector”198 may still
play an important, but secondary role in CIKR protection efforts
without Sector-Specific Agency designation. Specifically, such
organizations “will [a]ssist in assessing risk, prioritizing CI[]KR,
and enabling protective actions and programs within that sector;
[s]upport the national goal of enhancing CI[]KR protection . . .
and [c]ollaborate with all relevant security partners to share
security-related information within the sector, as appropriate.”199
Experts in this field also see a broader role for the NSA in
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. Larry M. Wortzel,
the Vice Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, stated in his testimony before the Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security that
the NSA should be at the forefront of cyber efforts, as opposed to
DHS or another government agency, for several significant
reasons.200 Wortzel cited the NSA’s “strong institutional culture of
adherence to the Foreign Intelligence and Surveillance Act”201 and
emphasized that agency personnel are unique from other members
of the intelligence community because in addition to being “skilled
and superbly trained,” they “are trained to protect the privacy and

197

See id.
Id. at 22.
199
Id.
200
Preventing Terrorist Attacks and Protecting Privacy in Cyberspace Before the
Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on Terrorism and Homeland Security, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Larry Wortzel, Vice Chairman, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission) [hereinafter Wortzel Testimony], available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/
hearings/testimony.cfm?id= 4169&wit_id=8316.
201
Wortzel Testimony, supra note 200; see also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1885 (2006); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), CTR. FOR
NAT’L SEC. STUDIES, http://www.cnss.org/fisa.htm (last visited Sept. 15, 2010).
198
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rights of American persons” and the NSA is the only agency with
“decades of experience . . . conducting operations in the electronic
and cyber realms.”202 The NSA also has “broad international
contacts with allies and friendly governments[,] . . . wide contacts
in the private sector. . . [and] a cadre of highly skilled linguists able
to work in the languages associated with the origin of the foreign
intrusions.”203
Mike McConnell, director of the NSA under the Clinton
administration, also supports the NSA’s leadership within the
realm of cybersecurity.204 McConnell asserts in an article
published in the Washington Post that the NSA “is the only agency
in the United States with the legal authority, oversight, and budget
dedicated to breaking the codes and understanding the capabilities
and intentions of potential enemies.”205 Google’s decision to
approach the NSA rather than DHS for cybersecurity assistance is
a step down the path that Wortzel and McConnell espouse.
Though individuals with intimate knowledge of cybersecurity,
including McConnell and Wortzel, have voiced their support for
the NSA’s role as the lead government agency for cybersecurity,
there is considerable opposition to this view. The NSA is often
characterized as a “spy agency.”206 A blog post responding to
Mike McConnell’s Washington Post article207 described the NSA
as “the ultra-secretive government spy agency that is responsible
for both listening in on other countries and for defending classified
government computer systems.”208 This critique supports the
NSA’s involvement in helping private companies enhance their
security systems, as some companies already do, and as

202

Wortzel Testimony, supra note 200.
Id.
204
Mike McConnell, We’re Losing the Cyber-War, Here’s the Strategy to Win It,
WASH. POST, Feb. 28, 2010, at B01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/02/25/AR2010022502493_pf.html.
205
Id.
206
Ryan Singel, Cyberwar Hype Intended to Destroy the Open Internet, THREAT LEVEL
BLOG, WIRED (Mar. 1, 2010, 6:56 P.M.), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/
2010/03/cyber-war-hype; see also Cybersecurity Is Not Your Gig, NSA!, infra note 223.
207
See McConnell, supra note 204.
208
Singel, supra note 206.
203
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McConnell has advocated.209
Opponents of the NSA’s
involvement in protecting private corporations believe that these
companies “have no business letting the NSA into their networks
or giving the NSA information that they won’t share with the
American people”210 and appear to draw an arbitrary line at large
companies like Google. This critique denies that a “cyberwar”
exists, and that therefore, the involvement of the NSA, the “spy
agency,” will not help to protect against cyberwar attackers; rather,
it will only threaten the openness of the Internet. This view
suggests that its proponents are afraid of the strength and power of
large corporations and therefore choose to remain ignorant of
legitimate cyber threats.
2. Information Sharing: Problems, Questions, and Concerns
Google’s announcement that it was targeted in a cyber attack
was incredibly significant due to its size and high profile. As
discussed above, however, Google and the NSA disclosed little
about the details of their subsequent partnership. According to
both the NIPP and a report published by the Government
Accountability Office (“GAO”) in March 2009, information
sharing is an integral part of the strategy to secure cyberspace.211
The term “information” includes public awareness of the national
security risks associated with cyberspace as well as the knowledge
of intrusions that are increasingly likely under the current security
regime.212
The GAO report recommended an aggressive
awareness campaign to increase the knowledge of both leaders and
the general public that the nation is regularly subjected to
cyberattacks.213
The GAO report also recommended White House
accountability and responsibility for the leadership and oversight

209

Id.
Id.
211
See 2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 14; see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY STRATEGY: KEY IMPROVEMENTS ARE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN
THE NATION’S POSTURE (Mar. 10, 2009) [hereinafter GAO], available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09432t.pdf.
212
GAO, supra note 211, at 9.
213
Id.
210
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of national cybersecurity policy.214
While the Obama
administration has taken steps toward improvements in
cybersecurity,215 the White House is conspicuously absent from the
Google-NSA alliance, and White House leadership is never
mentioned in the text of the National Infrastructure Protection
Plan. The NIPP dictates the appointment of a Sector-Specific
Agency for each CIKR sector, with DHS at the forefront of cyber
efforts, and ongoing information sharing efforts between public
and private entities within each sector.216 By contrast, the GAO
report argues that the White House, rather than a government
agency, must assume a leadership role in order for consciousness
to be raised regarding national cybersecurity concerns, both “to be
successful and to send the message to the nation and cyber critical
infrastructure owners that cybersecurity is a priority.”217 The
report states that without accountability, information sharing can
be jeopardized because there is no authority implementing and
employing incentives to encourage action, a large part of which is
information sharing.218
The discussion of Google’s Privacy Policy in Part I.B of this
Note raises additional questions about information sharing. The
information provided to Google by a given user is supposedly only
used “for the purposes described in [its] Privacy Policy and/or the
supplementary privacy policy notices for specific services[,]”219
with several additional purposes listed. One such supplement,
“[p]rotecting the rights or property of Google or our users,”220 fits
squarely in the context of the China cyberattacks. Google’s
intellectual property was stolen as a consequence of these
attacks,221 and it follows that the “rights or property” addition to
214

GAO, supra note 211, at 8.
See, e.g., CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 20; Remarks by the President,
supra note 20; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CYBERSECURITY: PROGRESS
MADE BUT CHALLENGES REMAIN IN DEFINING AND COORDINATING THE COMPREHENSIVE
NATIONAL INITIATIVE (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d10338.pdf.
216
See supra Part I.A.
217
GAO, supra note 211, at 8.
218
Id.
219
Google Privacy Policy, supra note 94.
220
Id.
221
Drummond, A New Approach to China, supra note 144.
215
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the privacy policy would allow the personal information of Google
users to be turned over to the NSA in conjunction with any
investigation conducted by the alliance.
Though Google says it will ask for consent before sharing
personal information with other companies or individuals outside
of Google, one of the specifically enumerated circumstances for
sharing personal information is applicable in large part to the
Google-NSA alliance. Google will share personal information
when there is
a good faith belief that access, use, preservation, or
disclosure of such information is reasonably
necessary to (a) satisfy any applicable law,
regulation, legal process or enforceable government
request, (b) enforce applicable Terms of Service,
including investigation of potential violations
thereof, (c) detect, prevent, or otherwise address
fraud, security, or technical issues, or (d) protect
against harm to the rights, property, or safety of
Google, its users or the public as required or
permitted by law.222
The language “enforceable government request” suggests that
if the NSA were to request personal information about Google
users as a part of its investigation into the cyberattacks, Google
could, and very well might, provide it. Organizations such as the
American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Privacy
Information Center vigorously criticize the NSA’s involvement in
cybersecurity, especially in the context of the alliance with Google
because so few details have been publicized.223 However, this type
222

Google Privacy Policy, supra note 94 (emphasis added).
See, e.g., Cybersecurity Is Not Your Gig, NSA!, BLOG OF RIGHTS: OFFICIAL BLOG OF
THE AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 9, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/blog/nationalsecurity-technology-and-liberty/cybersecurity-not-your-gig-nsa; EPIC Seeks Records on
Google-NSA Relationship, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://epic.org/2010/02/epic-seeks-records-on-google-n.html; EPIC Sues NSA to Force
Disclosure of Cyber Security Authority, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Feb. 4, 2010),
http://epic.org/2010/02/epic-sues-nsa-to-force-disclos.html; U.S. Security Agencies
Begging for a Cybersecurity “Cold War,” BLOG OF RIGHTS: OFFICIAL BLOG OF THE AM.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Mar. 3, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-securitytechnology-and-liberty/us-security-agencies-begging-cybersecurity-cold-war.
223
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of criticism would exist regardless of the particular government
agency leading national cyberspace protection efforts and the fact
still remains that cyberattacks are continually being launched
against the United States.
3. The Alliance Is Answering a Call for Change
The history of cybersecurity policy in the United States as
discussed in Part I.A of this Note demonstrates the nation’s
increasing dependence on cyber-based systems in many of its
CIKR sectors. The government remains aware that “traditional
telecommunications and Internet networks continue to converge,
and other infrastructure sectors are adopting the Internet as a
primary means of interconnectivity.”224 Many of the most recent
initiatives call for a change in leadership structure on the
government side of the public-private partnership, and the GoogleNSA alliance is accomplishing this goal with the NSA’s
assumption of leadership as the public sector partner in the
collaboration.
While a large portion of the most recent cybersecurity
initiative, the Cyberspace Policy Review released in late 2009,
remained consistent with previous government cybersecurity
policies, one recommendation was a relatively new and notable
change: a call for White House leadership.225 Like the NSA’s
leadership in the Google-NSA alliance, this recommendation
marks a significant departure from previous initiatives, which
generally called for Sector-Specific Agencies to assume leadership
roles for CIKR protection of individual sectors.226 The Cyberspace
Policy Review goes so far as to say that “[t]he status quo is no
longer acceptable . . . federal leadership and accountability for
cybersecurity should be strengthened . . . [by] clarifying the
cybersecurity-related roles and responsibilities of federal
Such statements could be
departments and agencies.”227
considered an admission that the previous initiatives have been
224
225
226

CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 20, at iii.
Id. at v.
See, e.g., 2006 NIPP, supra note 20; PDD 63, supra note 10; HSPD-7, supra note

20.
227

CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 20, at iii.
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unsuccessful. At a minimum, this proclamation calls for changes
in cybersecurity policy, and the Google-NSA alliance might well
be a change in the right direction. Despite the few available details
about the alliance, the NSA’s significant role in the collaboration
marks a shift from the established cybersecurity functions of
federal agencies.
Related to this change is the fact that the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan tasks the Department of Homeland
Security with the primary responsibility for cybersecurity policy,
as evidenced by its designation as the Sector-Specific Agency for
the Telecommunications and Information Technology sectors.228
As indicated in the Cyberspace Policy Review, however, there is a
cyber dimension across CIKR sectors due to increased use of the
Internet as a primary source of interconnectivity.229 The call for a
change in cybersecurity policy leadership is a response to the
perceived ineffectiveness under the leadership of DHS and the
increased convergence of sectors around the cyber dimension. In
May 2009, President Obama stated that for cybersecurity purposes,
“federal agencies have overlapping missions and don’t coordinate
and communicate nearly as well as they should—with each other
or with the private sector.”230
4. The Government Is Not Keeping Pace With Its Plan
The Cyberspace Policy Review issued by the White House
outlined a timeline for actions to be taken in the near and long term
to improve cybersecurity policy.231 Melissa Hathaway, the former
Senior Director for Cyberspace, served under both the Bush and
Obama administrations and publicly expressed concern prior to the
Google attacks that the government was not meeting the challenges
identified in the Cyberspace Policy Review.232 The country has
228

See 2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 3.
See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 20, at iii.
230
Remarks by the President, supra note 20.
231
See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW, supra note 20, at 37–38.
232
Melissa Hathaway, Government Must Keep Pace with Cybersecurity Threats, INFO.
SEC. MAG. (Oct. 2009), available at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/magazine
Feature/0,296894,sid14_gci1370150_mem1,00.html.
Among Ms. Hathaway’s
accomplishments are the following: leading the 60-day interagency review of
cybersecurity policies and programs across the federal government, overseeing the
229
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increasingly relied on technology in day-to-day activities, and
Hathaway writes that the United States has “not invested in the
resilience necessary to assure our businesses can operate in a
degraded environment.”233 Reliance on remote access and the
reduction in costs and manpower needs as a result of networked
control systems have led to weaknesses that opponents can
exploit.234 Accordingly, Hathaway states that the need for
increased cybersecurity has not been adequately addressed and that
any government response should be “focused, aggressive, and
well-resourced.”235
Hathaway’s article also suggests that collaborative efforts
between various agencies should “foster innovation and enable our
information and communications infrastructure to fuel the nation’s
economic growth.”236 While she applauds some recent efforts as
“first steps toward making real and lasting progress” in securing
cyberspace, bold steps and increased information sharing are still
required to protect the nation’s networks.237
Even Mike
McConnell, in his strongly worded support of the NSA’s
leadership wrote that “[t]he time to start [protecting cyberspace]
was yesterday.”238
B. The Google-NSA Alliance Reflects the Effectiveness of Current
Government Cybersecurity Policy
Several key elements of the Google-NSA alliance align with
existing government initiatives concerning cybersecurity.
Specifically, despite the dearth of publicized details about the
alliance, it fits within the framework of a public-private

development of the Cyberspace Policy Review, helping build the Comprehensive
National Cybersecurity Initiative (“CNCI”) under the Bush administration, leading
development of a cross-agency budget submission to support CNCI, establishing
relationships in Congress to gain bipartisan support for cybersecurity initiatives,
testifying and briefing with legislators over 150 times, and consulting with DoD and the
intelligence community in her capacity as a former principal at Booz Allen Hamilton. Id.
233
Id.
234
See id.
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
McConnell, supra note 204.
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partnership, which the government has identified as the key to
CIKR protection. The alliance is voluntary, as Google approached
the NSA, not the other way around. Finally, the alliance represents
a step towards improving cybersecurity practices by addressing the
existing lack of awareness as articulated in the National Strategy to
Secure Cyberspace. The combined power and resources of the two
organizations could result in new standards for cybersecurity
protection and will surely increase public awareness of the cyber
threat.
1. The Alliance Can Be Characterized as a Public-Private
Partnership
Since the issuance of President Clinton’s PDD-63 directive in
1998, technology has been considered part of the critical
infrastructure of the United States, and accordingly is best
protected through a collaborative relationship between the public
and private sectors.239 Government initiatives between 1998 and
the present day cite the public-private partnership as the key to
securing the nation’s critical infrastructure.240 The National
Infrastructure Protection Plan provides that Sector-Specific
Agencies are “responsible for collaborating with private sector
security partners and encouraging the development of appropriate
information-sharing and analysis mechanisms within the sector.”241
In the context of the alliance, the NSA fills the role of a SectorSpecific agency for technology and cyber systems in collaborating
with a private sector partner, Google.242
According to the articles written about the alliance, Google’s
motive for soliciting assistance from the NSA was to assess risk
Google’s
and help defend against future cyberattacks.243
prominent role in the cyber sector could result in the sharing of

239

PDD 63, supra note 10.
See supra Part I.A.
241
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 19.
242
The NIPP designates DHS, not the NSA, as the lead agency for the technology
sector. See supra Part II.B.2.
243
See, e.g., Nakashima, supra note 162 (stating that the partnership’s objective was to
better defend Google).
240
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security-related information within the sector, which will be
discussed later in this Note.244
2. The Alliance Was Formed Voluntarily
As reported in both The New York Times and the Washington
Post, Google approached the NSA for assistance, not the other way
around. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan specifically
states that “[p]rivate sector owners and operators are responsible
for taking action to support risk management planning and
investments in security . . . .”245 The level of investment in
security depends on a risk versus consequence analysis.246 First,
private sector enterprises consider what is known about the risk
environment,247 and in the cyber world, the answer is usually very
little due to the dynamic nature of the cyber risk environment.248
The federal government, however, can help inform critical security
investment decisions and operational planning,249 which is exactly
the position that the NSA has taken with Google.
Private companies also consider what is economically viable in
a competitive marketplace or an environment of limited
resources.250 Owners and operators in the private sector often
“rely on government entities to address risks outside of their
property or in situations in which the current threat exceeds an
enterprise’s capability to protect itself or mitigate risk.”251
Google’s decision to pull out of China is a clear indication that the
threat was substantial, and accordingly it has enlisted the NSA
because the China threat was significant enough to lead Google to
at least question its capability to protect itself.

244

See discussion infra Part II.B.3.
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 26.
246
Id.
247
Id.
248
See Cybersecurity, Innovation and the Internet Economy, 75 Fed. Reg. 44216 (July
28, 2010).
249
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 26.
250
See id.
251
Id.
245
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3. The Alliance Represents a Step Toward Addressing Cyber
Vulnerabilities and Best Practices
The pairing of the NSA and Google aligns with the
government’s goal of implementing protection programs across the
various CIKR sectors.252 The NIPP states that “[t]he risk
assessment and prioritization activities within each sector will help
identify requirements for current protective programs and
shortfalls for future efforts.”253 Even if the findings and solutions
implemented as a result of the alliance are never released to the
public, they can be shared within each individual sector as “best
practices” and to improve protective actions, which “involve
measures designed to prevent, deter and mitigate the threat; reduce
vulnerability to an attack or other disaster; minimize consequences;
and enable timely, efficient response and restoration in a postevent situation.”254
If no other details of the alliance are made available, the
cyberattacks on Google and capabilities of the NSA, discussed in
Part I, support the argument that Google approached the NSA to
utilize its security expertise in furtherance of these and other goals.
Publicizing the attacks is an admission of Google’s vulnerabilities
to attacks on its infrastructure, and by partnering with the NSA it
wishes to minimize consequences for its users and work toward
elimination of the threat.
The partnership was announced within a month after Google
publicly announced that a cyberattack had occurred.255 This quick
response is timely and efficient, and constitutes a measure to
restore both the company’s own confidence in its security
measures and the trust and support of Google users worldwide.
Regardless of the final outcome of the alliance, it addresses current
cyber vulnerabilities, and could result in the application of a set of
best practices to be shared within the cyber and technology sectors.

252

See id. at 45–48.
Id. at 45.
254
Id.
255
The Google attacks were announced on January 12, 2010, and the Washington Post
article appeared on February 4, 2010. See Drummond, A New Approach to China, supra
note 144; Nakashima, supra note 162.
253
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4. The Alliance Promotes Information Sharing Between the
Public and Private Sectors
The interdependence between the public and private sectors is
readily apparent in the technology sector and beyond. Much of the
nation’s critical infrastructure, including transportation systems,
communication networks, and the national power grid, depends
upon the ability of networks in both the public and private sectors
to share information in cyberspace.256
The Google-NSA
partnership can allow for the sharing of critical information to
analyze the recent attack on Google without infringing privacy
rights.257 The alliance is a real-world manifestation of a stated
policy goal of the United States and could allow the country “to
develop a unified and coordinated approach to defending our
nation’s assets.”258 One proponent of this course of action believes
that specifically, “[t]his alliance will help Google better defend its
intellectual property critical to our nation’s economy while
providing the NSA key insight into the attack methods and motives
of the attackers.”259
Mike McConnell wrote in an article in the Washington Post
that “an effective partnership with the private sector [must be
formed] so information can move quickly back and forth from
public to private and classified to unclassified—to protect the
nation’s critical infrastructure.”260 While he acknowledges that
arrangements like this alliance “will muddy the waters between the
traditional roles of the government and the private sector,”
McConnell states that the Google-NSA partnership “point[s] to the
kind of joint efforts—and shared challenges” that are likely to be
seen in the future.261

256

Google, The NSA, and the Increasing Interdependence Between the Public and
Private Sectors, FED. NEWS RADIO, Feb. 18, 2010, http://stage-v4.federalnewsradio.
com/?sid=1891928&nid=293.
257
Id.
258
Id.
259
See id.
260
McConnell, supra note 204.
261
Id.
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III. PROBLEMS ACROSS SECTORS FURTHER SUGGEST THAT
CURRENT CYBERSECURITY POLICY NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
The public-private partnership has been a cornerstone of
critical infrastructure protection for over a decade. In its basic
structure, the Google-NSA alliance fits within the framework of
the public-private partnership: a government entity and a private
corporation collaborating to better protect cyberspace. The
alliance preserves several of the foundation principles of cyber
policy from 1998 to the present, most notably the basic structure of
the public-private partnership. In addition, the initiative taken by
Google, the private sector counterpart, to work with the NSA as a
government partner comports with the NIPP, which is
demonstrative of the effectiveness of the policy. Regardless of
whether the alliance ultimately proves successful, it addresses
current cyber vulnerabilities, and the relative success or failure of
this partnership could help in shaping best practices to be shared
within the cyber and technology sectors. Finally, endorsements
from two individuals (Wortzel and McConnell) with significant
knowledge and expertise in cybersecurity and the current
initiatives, can be considered a strong indication that the alliance is
not a significant departure from current policies.
Though the Google-NSA alliance retains some important
elements of the current cybersecurity posture, its differences from
the policies in force are much more significant. First, while DHS
rather than the NSA has traditionally served as the lead
government agency in critical infrastructure protection within the
technology sector, the NSA functions as the de facto lead
government agency in the Google-NSA alliance. The alliance,
then, allows the NSA to fill a considerably broader role than
previously provided for it in the NIPP and significantly departs
from the current policies.
Cyber systems also transcend individual CIKR sectors due to
their broad reach, as indicated by the support of the NSA’s
leadership by several individuals with highly specialized
knowledge of cyberspace and national security. Proponents of this
course of action urge that the NSA, rather than DHS, assume a
leadership role in cyberspace protection because protective efforts
would not be confined to a given sector. However, as presently
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drafted, existing policies do not contemplate such a role for the
NSA. Moreover, substituting the NSA for DHS would not
significantly disturb the framework of the public-private
partnership; it simply substitutes one government actor for another.
However, because the current regime tasks only DHS with
cyberspace protection, Google’s choice to partner with the NSA
represents a departure from the type of public-private partnership
contemplated by the NIPP and other initiatives.
In publicizing news about the China cyberattacks, Google
remained silent about the details of its subsequent partnership with
the NSA, refusing even to confirm or deny the news reports.
Merely publicizing information about the attack is insufficient to
satisfy the recommendations of the GAO report and the NIPP to
drastically raise the level of national awareness about cyberspace
protection. An increase in information sharing between public and
private entities cannot reasonably be anticipated without national
awareness; there is therefore little room for improvement of the
existing cybersecurity measures without it. The alliance also does
not comport with either the GAO or the NIPP regarding national
awareness of cyber protection, which is indicative of
inconsistencies in cybersecurity policies. These inconsistencies in
turn suggest that the current initiatives are largely ineffective and
that the Google-NSA alliance is a positive development in
cybersecurity.
The most recent initiatives also appeal for a change in
government leadership structure, and the Google-NSA alliance is
accomplishing this goal with the NSA’s assumption of leadership
as the public sector partner in the collaboration. Finally, the
government has fallen behind in its implementation: current
policies make broad recommendations about how to proceed with
cyberspace protection, but little improvement has been seen to
date. The alliance represents a significant step away from the
present initiatives as a response to this lack of progress.
Taken as a whole, these departures from current cybersecurity
initiatives indicate that the existing regime is glaringly defective.
The defects of the current posture and policies are perhaps best
illustrated by another established public-private partnership, also
falling squarely within the overarching domain of cyberspace: the
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Defense Industrial Base (“DIB”), governed by the Department of
Defense as its Sector-Specific Agency pursuant to the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan.262 “The DIB is DoD, the U.S.
government, and the private sector worldwide industrial complex
with capabilities to perform research and development (“R&D”),
design, produce, deliver, and maintain military weapon systems,
subsystems, components, or parts to meet military
requirements.”263 It includes many thousands of foreign and
domestic entities, as well as their subcontractors, who perform
work for the Department of Defense and other federal departments
and agencies.264 The Defense Industrial Base provides defenserelated products and services used to “equip, inform, mobilize,
deploy, and sustain forces conducting military operations
worldwide,”265 which includes the domain of cyberspace. Only a
small percentage of Defense Industrial Base facilities are actually
owned by the Department of Defense, so the efforts described in
the Defense Industrial Base Sector-Specific Plan (“DIB SSP”)
largely “focus on DoD and government actions to support private
owner/operator efforts at DIB facilities determined to be critical to
national security.”266
The DIB SSP divides the sector into segments, sub-segments,
and commodities.267 While many of the Defense Industrial Base
segments are irrelevant for purposes of this Note, the information
technology segments, which encompass the sub-segments of
262

U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE: CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND
KEY RESOURCES SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLAN AS INPUT TO THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE
PROTECTION PLAN 3 (2007) [hereinafter DIB SSP], available at http://www.dhs.gov/
xlibrary/assets/nipp-ssp-defense-industrial-base.pdf.
263
Id. at 4.
264
Id. at 5.
265
Id.
266
Id.; cf. DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE NUMBER 3020.40 (Aug.
19, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d3020_40.pdf. The Directive
updates, renames, and reissues the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP),
“which addresses DIB assets owned by the private sector and DOD-owned elements of
the DIB. Thus, the DIB plan purports to focus on the privately owned and operated
efforts at DIB facilities rather than on the small fraction of DIB facilities owned by the
DOD.” Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Brown, Sovereignty in Cyberspace: Legal Propriety
of Protecting Defense Industrial Base Information Infrastructure, 64 A.F. L. REV. 211,
226–27 (2009).
267
See DIB SSP, supra note 262, at 5–6.
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“command control, computers, and intelligence [and] information
security” within the Defense Industrial Base, link the information
technology sector (governed by the Department of Homeland
Security, pursuant to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan) to
the defense sector.268
Cyberspace extends across critical
infrastructure sectors,269 and the unifying factor of information
technology creates an especially strong parallel between these two
sectors. To facilitate information sharing, the DIB SSP identifies
security partners within the federal government and Department of
Defense itself, within the private sector, and on a state, local, and
international scale.270
Lieutenant Colonel Todd A. Brown271 argues that the DIB SSP
is deficient in identifying the specific efforts the Department of
Defense will take to coordinate CIKR protection within the private
sector; rather, he claims that the plan “restates the edits of HSPD-7
and the NIPP” and points out that the “D[o]D will work with the
DHS to identify overlaps and gaps in responsibility with other
sector-specific agencies with regard to DIB assets that belong to
other sectors.”272 Brown believes that the plan is “particularly
inadequate [in] its reference to cyber security risks,”273 and the
plan itself actually maintains that “[w]hile cyber security is an
issue that could affect any facility, DoD does not perform networkor system-level assessments.”274 Rather, the plan states that “DIB
assets are primarily owned by the private sector; and that (1) there
are no regulatory requirements for conducting formal risk
assessments, (2) large companies conduct their own risk
assessments as part of prudent business practices, and (3) the
268

Id. at 5.
See supra Part II.A.3.
270
See DIB SSP, supra note 262, at 6–10.
271
Brown currently serves as the Judge Advocate for the 187th Fighter Wing of the
Alabama Air National Guard. See 187th Fighter Wing, Resources, ALA. AIR NAT’L
GUARD, http://www.187fw.ang.af.mil/resources/index.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2010).
272
Brown, supra note 266, at 227.
273
Id. Indeed, the government has begun to recognize its deficiencies in approaching
sector-specific planning against cyber threats. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION: CURRENT CYBER SECTOR-SPECIFIC PLANNING
APPROACH NEEDS REASSESSMENT (Sept. 2009), available at http://www.gao.gov
/new.items/d09969.pdf.
274
DIB SSP, supra note 262, at 17.
269
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D[o]D aims to ensure awareness and risk management best
practices throughout the DIB.”275 The National Infrastructure
Protection Plan emphasizes a “single national effort” for
integration of the United States’s CIKR protection initiatives,276
and Brown expresses concern that small members of the Defense
Industrial Base in the private sector are being overlooked, because
they may not have the resources to conduct risk assessments on the
same scale as large companies, and asks how the Department of
Defense “aim[s] to ensure awareness across the entire sector.”277
Google, a veritable giant in the realm of technology and
cyberspace, is a large private company with significant resources
available to assess the risk of cyber threats it may confront.278 As
indicated by the recent partnership with the NSA, Google has
enlisted help from the government in analyzing the cyber risks it
has already faced and will continue to combat, presumably because
its own cybersecurity resources have proven insufficient. If the
resources of large private companies in the Telecommunications/
Information Technology sectors are proving to be inadequate, it is
unreasonable to assume that smaller private entities within the
sector have the capabilities to defend against cyber threats.
Applying Brown’s perspective on the Defense Industrial Base to
this sector, however, exposes a strong parallel between the two
sectors: small-scale members of private industry across CIKR
sectors face unique challenges in forming public-private
partnerships. These obstacles are twofold: smaller private entities
do not have the resources of a giant like Google to assess cyber
risks on their own, and may not be aware of the opportunities for
information sharing available to them under the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan. Thus, both the Defense Industrial
Base and the technology sector have considerable gaps to fill in
cybersecurity protection as articulated by the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, suggesting that the current policies
are ineffective.

275
276
277
278

Brown, supra note 266, at 227–28.
2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at i.
Brown, supra note 266, at 228.
See supra Part II.
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Brown also argues that the DIB SSP is noncompliant “with the
HSPD-7 directive that the tasked departments share information
about cyber threats.”279 The National Infrastructure Protection
Plan recommends that information sharing between the public and
private sectors be conducted using a networked approach280 with
significant reliance on critical infrastructure information provided
by the private sector.281 However, the DIB SSP does not discuss
coordination of information sharing; rather, it states that the
Department of Defense “relies on private sector organizations to
exchange information regarding DIB infrastructure.”282 Brown
asserts that responsibility for these information-sharing efforts is
being relegated back to the Department of Homeland Security,
while the Department of Defense seems to take on a supporting
role in “efforts to address cyber incidents, conduct vulnerability
assessments, develop risk management strategies, and facilitate
information sharing.”283 The DIB SSP lists a number of federal
agency partners in its CIKR protection within the sector, including
the Department of Homeland Security: the Office of Infrastructure
Protection (“OIP”) and the Office of Cyber Security and
Telecommunications (“CST”) are jointly “responsible for
deterring, preventing, and defeating cyber incidents across all CI[
]KR sectors.”284 As discussed in Part II.A.3, the most recent
policy initiatives have called for a change in cybersecurity policy
leadership. Thus, the argument that the Google-NSA alliance is a
distinct departure from current policies due to inefficiencies is
further strengthened by the analogous difficulties in information
sharing within the Defense Industrial Base, a related CIKR sector.
Perhaps the most salient point of Brown’s analysis is that the
emphasis on voluntary participation on the part of the private
sector is the greatest challenge in successful information
sharing.285 The sensitive nature of such information, be it relevant
to business or security, renders its safekeeping critical because
279
280
281
282
283
284
285

Brown, supra note 266, at 228.
See 2006 NIPP, supra note 20, at 57–66.
Brown, supra note 266, at 228.
Id. (quoting DIB SSP, supra note 262, at 7).
Brown, supra note 266, at 228.
DIP SSP, supra note 262, at 8.
Brown, supra note 266, at 228–29.
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unauthorized disclosure or access could result in “serious damage
to private industry, the economy, public safety, or public
security.”286 As such, the information sharing problems and
concerns discussed in Part II.A.2 of this Note are pervasive across
sectors,287 further reinforcing the argument that current
government cybersecurity policies are largely ineffective. It
follows that the Google-NSA alliance represents a departure from
these strategies pursuant to the most recent initiatives taken
regarding cybersecurity policy, and proposes a unique solution to
the problems the United States faces in the cybersecurity arena.
Whether or not the Google-NSA alliance is ultimately
successful in filling the gaps left by current cybersecurity policy, it
should be viewed as a step toward improvement. Members of both
the public and private sectors have expressed concern about
cybersecurity in the United States,288 and this unlikely pairing
represents a unified front to address a common concern. The
framework of the alliance has incorporated the hallmarks of the
current policy initiatives, most significantly the public-private
partnership, which should be satisfactory to those supporters of the
present policy framework. While many outspoken critics reject the
notion of “cyberwar” generally and the security concerns that
logically follow, some even saying that cyberwar does not exist,289
286
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the fact remains that Google, an Internet giant in every sense of the
word, was subjected to cyberattacks.290 It subsequently admitted
its security vulnerabilities and strongly suggested that its users take
precautions when using the Internet. Though this statement is far
from an admission of the existence of “cyberwar,” it is conclusive
proof of a significant threat. Current policies are simply not
enough to combat the severity of the threats posed by cyberspace.
Though the security measures that have been taken form a solid
foundation, the existing cyberspace protection programs are simply
insufficient. The Google-NSA alliance has reformulated the
touchstones of the early and present cybersecurity efforts to
increase voluntary information sharing and best practices between
the public and private sectors. Initiatives such as the Google-NSA
alliance must be supported by the public to prevent further
cyberattacks and increase the security of the nation’s cyber
systems.
CONCLUSION
The Google-NSA alliance is unprecedented, regardless of
whether it actually demonstrates a departure from the nation’s
current cybersecurity policies.
In comparing the Defense
Industrial Base and the Telecommunications and Information
Technology sectors, a larger problem emerges: in practice, current
cyberspace protection programs simply do not have the broad
reach across individual sectors that PDD-63 and its progeny
intended. Cybersecurity is a necessary component of CIKR
protection across the nation’s infrastructure, and the most recent
cybersecurity policies essentially acknowledge the shortcomings of
the present initiatives.291
If the Google-NSA alliance proves to be a solution to the
deficiencies of present cybersecurity policy, it would not be
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infallible because questions of privacy, international implications,
and information sharing and security remain. The Google
cyberattacks that prompted the alliance resulted in theft of
intellectual property, which can be characterized as “the heart and
core value of companies worldwide.”292 A global company’s
intellectual property includes “trade secrets, proprietary formulas,
copyrights, trademarks, and source code . . . .”293 While privacy
concerns about individual user data have a strong foundation, this
Note proposes that even the strongest privacy advocate consider
the large-scale implications resulting from corporate intellectual
property theft. If a future cyberattack were to successfully obtain
additional intellectual property belonging to Google, the security
of Google users’ private information would be jeopardized.
Cyberspace, by definition a difficult area to defend, remains
largely unprotected, despite a decade’s worth of security
initiatives. All users of the Internet should be supportive of the
fledgling partnership between private industry and the public
sector as they work towards the strongest possible security solution
to secure cyberspace for the benefit of all Americans.
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